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The Marketing of New
State and Local Government Issues
THE demand for funds by state and local governments, discussed
in Chapter 2, is dominated by the complex problem of public capital
expenditures. The supply of funds, discussed in Chapter 3, is dom-
inated by the fluctuating attractiveness of high-grade, tax-exempt
but rather low-yielding securities to institutional and individual
investors. The institutions for marketing state and local government
Obligations supply the vehicle by which the disparate requirements
of these two sides of the market are equated. This market is also
the place in which the timing differences that inevitably arise be-
tween these factors are ironed out. This marketing system embraces
both investment and commercial banks and includes very small as
well as very large financial institutions.
The function of this chapter will be to provide a narrative pic-
ture of the marketing process and to present such quantitative data
—unfortunately rather scattered—as bears on and measures the op.
èrations of this market.
MARKETING PROCESS
Once a state or local governmental unit has completed the neces-
sary legal steps that authorize it to borrow money, the marketing
process follows a fairly standardized pattern. If, as is usual, the
issue is to be sold by competitive bidding,1 the intention to borrow
is announced formally (informal news has already been circulated
in most cases) and bids are invited. In the somewhat rarer case of
a negotiated offering, a consultant or an investment banking house
is engaged as a financial adviser. If an investment banking house
acts as the adviser, it may also organize the underwriting syndicate.
This dual role, however, is frowned on by some critics. In the more
common case of a competitive sale, the second phase is that of the
organization of groups for the purpose of bidding on the issue.
1Inthe 'year 1957, 86 per cent of the public offerings were sold through public
sealed bids, 12 per cent through negotiated sales, and 2 per cent were placed
directly—largely with state and local government pension funds. IDA Statistical
Bulletin, No. 6, January 1958, p. 8.
101THE MARKETING OF NEW ISSUES
The third stage, which almost always follows hard upon the award
of the bid to the group offering the lowest borrowing cost, is the
reoffering of the securities by the successful bidders to ultimate in-
vestors.
The marketing of new state and local government issues is one
of the principal lines of business of the big investment banking
firms, and a few firms specialize in this business. This new issues
market differs from the corporate one in that commercial banks
are allowed to participate in it and are an important part of the
market. The shares of individual firms in underwriting syndicates
are not published, and so only general impressions of relative size
can be presented. From some statistics relative to syndicate man-
agement presented later in this chapter, it would appear that com-
mercial banks underwrite somewhat more than one-half of the dol-
lar volume of new general credit obligations. Federal Reserve mem-
ber commercial banks are barred from underwriting revenue obli-
gations, however, and so the commercial bank share of the total
market is probably abOut two-fifths. A dozen houses or banks that
are recognized leaders, capable of managing great syndicates, prob-
ably account for about half the market in dollar terms. The next
dozen account for about one-sixth of the market. More than 500
firms participate to some extent in underwriting and marketing new
state and local government issues. Since investment banking, as an
industry, has already been adequately described in the literature
of finance,2 the function of this chapter will be to deal with the
special aspects of this system that relate uniquely to the marketing
of state and local government obligations.
During the postwar decade, state and local government offerings
became an increasingly important part of total investment banking
business. This is true if measured in terms of the dollar volume of
issues handled, even more so if measured in terms of gross revenue
produced. The margins on state and local government security of-
ferings, while less than those prevailing on equity security sales,
are generally considerably larger than those received from the un-
derwriting of corporate bond sales.
The mechanics of bidding for and reoffering state and local gov-
ernment securities have been so• well developed that investment
2Suchas Fundamentals of investment Banking, Fennelly, McClure, and Clark,
editors (Prentice-Hall, 1947). See particularly Section Two, Part in;SectionFive;
and Section Nine, Part i.
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bankers can handle the issues of small as well as large governmental
units quite economically. In practice, the smaller state and local
governmental units seem to suffer almost no adverse effects because
of their size.3 The serial nature of the obligations, the fact that they
often have complex coupon structures, and the diversity of markets
complicate the marketing problem. The gross margin in state and
local government underwriting needs to be larger to allow for greater
marketing costs. Possibly the greater price variability which we study
in greater detail in Chapter 6 is also a factor in these wider under-
writing margins. Market strategy also differs; underwriting groups
for an offering of state and local government issues usually are held
together longer than is needed in the case of corporate marketings.
COMMERCIAL BANKS AS UNDERWRITERS OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFERINGS
The activities of commercial banks in underwriting state and
local government security offerings explain one of the major differ-
ences between this market and that for other securities such as
those of corporations. Since 1933 Federal Reserve member banks
have been prohibited from participating in the underwriting of
securities, except the general obligations of government bodies.
This fact has special significance since the commercial banking
system is the biggest single institutional investor in such obligations,
and the trust departments operated by the bigger member banks
control the buying of substantial amounts of these securities. Thus
banks are important buyers as well as sellers of these securities. The
number of banks having formal dealer departments is quite large,
but those who are continuously active in this new issues market
appear to number not much more than fifty But many
more than this number maintain some degree of interest in the
market. A large number of the sales of small issues are to the local
banker. The reports of sales of new issues in the Bond Buyer dis-
close innumerable cases of local issues going to a nearby bank.
8FrankE. Morris, Research Director for the Investment Bankers Association
of America, reached much the same conclusion. He seemed to feel that the
"equality of advantage" went down to even lower size groups than indicated
here. "Size Characteristics of Municipal Bond Issues," IBA Statistical Bulletin,
January 1957, No. 2.
4October1955, 57 commercial banks were listed in the Blue List directory
of advertisers. A part of this group is relatively inactive except in local issues.
About 20 banks appear to maintain Continuous operations in the national
market.
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This type of business probably should not be considered as within
the category of open capital market transactions but should be
treated as a kind of parochial or local finance. Many bankers feel
responsible for seeing to it that their local governmental units "get
at least one decent But, apart from community pride and
other noneconomic considerations, bankers have a binding customer
relationship with the local governmental units. The deposits of local
governmental units often can be employed profitably. The necessary
condition for getting these deposits may be to support the market
for the obligations of their governmental depositors. While no
geographical distribution of bank-owned state and local government
obligations is publicly available, the comments of examiners and
others indicate that local holdings almost always predominate.6 The
fact that many commercial banks specialize in or limit their
writing activities to the issues of local or nearby state and local
governmental units should not be thought of as indicating any sub-
stantial quantitative restriction on such activities. The largest com-
mercial bank in the United States, located in the state of California,
limits its underwriting activities to the securities of that state or of
local governmental units within that state. But within this limit
this bank appears to do an excellent business and holds the largest
commercial bank portfolio, which also means the largest institu-
tional portfolio of state and local government securities in •the
United States.1 At the other extreme, a large New York City bank
which has been one of the most active managers of underwriting
accounts itself holds only a small investment portfolio of these
securities.
The presence of commercial banks in the groups that underwrite
state and local government obligations gives some special marketing
advantages to such groups. Commercial banks, being investors as
well as underwriters, do not have to fret about the financing of their
dealer inventories to the same extent that nonbank dealers do.
Furthermore, the leading commercial bank in a buying group may
5Inscanning the lists of sales of new issues in the Bond Buyer, our tabulators
several times noticed cases of sales of local issues at• interest rates which seemed
to be lower than those prevailing in the central money and capital markets,
particularly in times of strain.
6SeeHengren speeches referred to in Chapter 3, note 14.
7"Obligationsof States and Political Subdivisions Held by the 100 Largest
Banks," Bond Buyer, February 4, 1956.
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also "bank" or finance an underwriting deal ifit must be kept
together beyond the date of delivery of the bonds and therefore
require such financing. As a result, banks may be rather firm
holders and tend to work on the side of keeping groups together
when these groups are not successful in selling out their offerings
quickly. En other words, the presence of one or two large commer-
cial banks adds to the fundamental underwriting strength of a
group.
The great commercial banks have close ties with many potential
customers: their own country correspondents, trust departments of
related banks, wealthy individuals, and other financial institutions.
The general knowledge by banks of who has money for investment
probably gives them a rather substantial advantage in the market-
ing of state and local government obligations. On the other hand,
the many facets of commercial-bank customer relationships prob-
ably make them unusually cautious as to the quality of securities
they merchandise. They may be effective salesmen of the highest
quality obligations; their zeal in selling intermediate grades is not
quite as clear.
Commercial banks which are members of the Federal Reserve
System would very much like to have the present statutes, which
limit them to the underwriting of state and local government gen-
eral obligations, liberalized. The volume of revenue financing is
large and the profit margins are higher than those on general
obligations. Commercial banks would like to have access to this
new sector of the market. Commercial banks can invest in these
obligations and $1,849 million of such securities were in insured
commercial bank portfolios on June 30, The effort of com-
mercial banks to extend their underwriting privileges is, of course,
bitterly opposed by the nonbank dealers and underwriters. With
one important exception, commercial banks tend to mix with the
nonbank dealers in the distribution of membership of bidding
groups. The one exception is in the groups that bid for the bonds
of the public housing authorities. The historical reason for a sharp
bank-nonbank division in this one case seems to go back to the fact
that nonbank dealers initially opposed banking participation in
this market. Commercial banks finally won the right to underwrite
SAssets,Liabilities, and Capital Accounts of all Insured Banks, June 30, 1956,
Call No. 45(Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.).
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PFIA obligations, but this did not salve the injured feelings. A
nonbank dealer group has clung together and has won most of the
offerings. They have been opposed by a so-called "bank" group
which is managed by a commercial bank and has a majority of
commercial bank members but which also embraces some nonbank
dealers.
STRUCTURE OF SYNDICATES
In most respects the groups organized to bid on state and local
government new issues are similar to those organized for the whole-
sale buying of corporate issues. But moderate differences in prac-
tices exist. In the first place, management fees are rather uncommon
in groups organized for state and local government bidding except
in the case of housing issues and negotiated deals for revenue bonds.
Management fees in this latter group are quite like those prevailing
in groups buying corporate securities. The groups organized for
state and local government bids have more regional character than
is true of corporate groups. There is often, though not always, a
better market for a state and local government issue in the territory
of the issuing body; local investment banking houses and local
commercial banks often have an insider's advantage in selling this
market. Furthermore, it is probable that managers, in forming a
group to bid on a state and local government issue, emphasize
sales ability over underwriting strength rather more than would be
the case in bidding on a corporate obligation.
Investment banking relationships have considerable historical
continuity. The same names will be associated time after time in
groups bidding on a specific issuers obligations. When the market
is considered to be uncertain, buying groups lose some of their
continuity. Weaker firms drop out if they do not care to assume
the underwriting risks; stronger firms may drop out of accounts
if they do not agree on pricing policies. They may reappear later—
if they do not exercise their "drop-out" privilege too frequently or
arbitrarily.9
Many evidences of institutional pride, of syndicate politics, and
9Theresources of this project did not permit a study of the continuity of
groups but that they have such continuity is evident from a reading of the
offering advertisements. A specially interesting facet of such a study, if it were
ever made, would be of the rise and fall of individual houses in the rankings
involved in these listings.
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of strategy similar to those that can be found in the syndicates
organized for corporate offerings can be observed in state and local
government buying groups. Many older and better known houses
will not participate in a buying group unless it be as a "major"
participant: i.e., with an allotment as large as that received by any
other house in the group. Some houses will not participate unless
their names appear high on the list of firms in the reoffering ad-
vertisements. At least one house sometimes prefers to have its name
omitted from the offering advertisements when it is not a manager
of the account or cannot secure the advertising position it prefers.
It is customary to have the name of the manager of a buying group
appear on the left-hand side of the first line of advertisement an-
nouncing the reoffering. But the holding of this position is some-
times juggled. Suppose a New York firm and a Chicago bank start
as co-managers to form a buying group to bid on a forthcoming
issue of a western state. Another firm with a strong sales position
on the West Coast might be willing to join the group only if it
were admitted as a co-manager. In such a case, the New York City
advertisement might list the New York firm in the prized left-hand
first line; the Chicago bank would take this place in advertisement
appearing in Chicago; the third firm might have its name in the
coveted position in a San Francisco advertisement. Advertising ap-
pearing in a magazine of national coverage, such as the Bond Buyer,
probably would come clOser to measuring which firm was the real
leader in the group. Other matters of position in advertising some-
times are subject to acrimonious dispute.
MANAGEMENT OF THE SYNDICATES
Both the great investment banking houses and the commercial
banks that are active in the national market for new municipal
issues like to assume a role of management in the formation and
operation of underwriting syndicates. Part of the reason is one of
profit; in some syndicates, particularly those for revenue obligations,
management fees are allowed in the syndicate arrangement. Even
where there are no management fees, the manager is usually in a
somewhat more strategic position to dictate terms and also to effect
rapid distribution of the portion of liability assumed by his firm
as an underwriter. Furthermore, the manager's role is one of con-
siderable prestige. In the negotiation for formation of a syndicate,
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leading firms will sometimes refuse to participate unless allowed
to come in as managers or co-managers.
The recently. initiated tabulations of the Investment Bankers
Association of America furnished our first quantitative clues as to
the relative importance of various firms in managing syndicates.
Table 17 shows the first 50 firms in the order of importance in the
management of new issues during the year 1957. The accounts
managed by these 50 firms accounted for almost four-fifths of the
total public offerings of that year. This list of firms includes 16
commercial banks and 34 investment banking firms. As can be seen
from the list, the great commercial banks tend to dominate the
management of general obligations accounts. Only one investment
banking firm is among the first five in importance in management
of general obligation accounts, and only three such firms are in
the list of the ten most important ones. However, since investment
banking firms control the market for revenue obligations, the
total dollar volume of accounts they manage slightly, exceeds that
of commercial banks.
A very high degree of specialization exists in the management
role. Some houses or banks specialize in public housing authority
obligations; some firms specialize in toll road bonds, still others
in school obligations. Some firms have special competence for deal-
ing with water and sewer revenue obligations; still others concen-
trate on school building authority bonds. Regional specialization
is also evident. The third most important manager in 1957 was the
Bank of America, which concentrates its activities almost wholly
within the state of California. Naturally regional specialization is
even greater in the smaller local accounts, not included in this
tabulation.
BUYING STRATEGY
Once a syndicate has been organized for the purpose of bidding
on a new issue, the determination of bidding strategy takes place
in several steps: the determination of the probable price(yields)
at which the various maturities of the issue can be sold (the. "re-
off ering scale"); the selection of the gross margin or spread for which
the group will work; the of a coupon or a coupon
structure that will "produce" enough gross revenue at the reoffer-
ing scale previously determined to cover the gross margin or
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TABLE 17
Principal Managing Underwriters of New Municipal Issues, 1957
(in millions of dollars)
General
Obligation RevenueTotal
Halsey Stuart & Co., Inc. $367 $225 $592
First National City Bank of New York 435 435
Bank of America, N.T. 8c S.A. 360 360
Bankers Trust Company 326 326
Chase Manhattan Bank 300 .... 300
Blyth & Co., Inc. 76 187 263
First Boston Corporation 80 174 254
Harris Trust & Savings Bank 228 .... 228
Smith, Barney & Co. 48 162 210
Lehman Bros. 112 95 207
John Nuveen & Co. 56 117 173
First National Bank of Chicago 153 153
Northern Trust Company of Chicago 134 .... 134
Harriman, Ripley & Co., Inc. 64 66 130
B. J. Van Ingen & Co., Inc. 34 94 127
Kidder, Peabody Sc Co. 81 27 108
Glore, Forgan 8c Co. 61 39 100
Eastman Dillon, Union Securities Sc Co. 30 59 88
Phelps, Fenn & Co. 72 13 85
Drexel & Co. 26 52 78
First of Michigan Corporation 52 22 74
Kuhn, Loeb & Co. 57 15 73
C. J. Devine & Co. 43 26 69
Marine Trust Co. of Western New York 66 66
Chemical Corn Exchange Bank 56 56
Ira Haupt Sc Co. 11 40 51
F. S. Smithers & Co. 8 39 46
Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. 46 ... 46
Equitable Securities Corporation 25 17 42.
Pierce, Carrison, Wulbern, Inc. .... 35 35
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York 34 34
J. P. Morgan & Co., Inc. 34 .... 34
Salomon Bros. & Hutzler 20 13 32
Shields & Company 17 14 31
White, Weld & Co. 10 20 30
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane 19 8 27
Ohio Company 4 22 26
Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co. .... 26 26
American Trust Co., San Francisco 21 21
• (continued on next page)




Braun, Bosworth & Co., Inc. $21 .,. $21
Security-First National Bank ofLos Angeles 19 .... 19
Robinson-Humphrey Company,Inc. a $19 19
Butcher & Sherrerd 3 16 19
Philadelphia National Bank 17 .... 17
Goldman, Sachs & Co. 7 10 16
First Southwest Company 10 5 14
J. M. Dam & Company, Inc. 13 .... 13
Rauscher, Pierce & Co., Inc. 4 10 14
Sterne, Agee & Leach 9





a Lessthan half a million.
Based on issues of $500,000 or more. In co-managed issues the amount of the
issue is divided equally among the co-managers, but each co-manager is credited
with one issue with respect to the number of issues.
Source: IBA Statistical Bulletin, No. 6, January 1958, p. 9.
"spread" and still permit a bid of par or better for the issue being
offered.'° The first point is primarily one of market judgment but
strategic considerations enter into the second and third points.
Experienced investment bankers develop considerable skill in
judging the marketability of a given issue. Judgment of a given
issue is based on two distinct types of factors: the quality or market
appeal of that issue in relation to the general structure of yields,
and the over-all interest rate or yield structure. The larger issues
announced for sale usually have been or will then be appraised
by the leading investment services and have rating grades assigned
to them. This rating grade determines much of the market appeal
of an issue. But the judgment of investment quality is considered
to be considerably more refined than can be expressed in a sIngle
rating grade. Investment bankers know that issues of some areas
and of some types have greater appeal. to investors than is true
other issues. Investors' preferences may be illogical—indeed they
often seem illogical,1' but these preferences determine the shape of
10SeeAppendix B.Inthe sale of some term bond issues and a few serial bonds.
bids of less than par or of some small margin less than par are permitted, but
the offering terms for most serial bond issues require a bid of par or better.
In a few cases, the net price cannot be much in excess of par.
11Whichpreferences are illogical and which are not may itself be seriously
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the market; they are vital data that enter into the calculation of
bidding prices. It is common for those organizing buying or bidding
groups to canvass the market to determine the views of leading
investors with respect to individual issues, as well as the funds that
such investors have earmarked for purchases of tax-exempt secu-
rities.
The degree of informal pre-bid selling is hard to judge; the testi-
mony on this point is conflicting. Some managers of bidding groups
apparently try to have most of the real selling job done before a
bid is submitted. apparently do not put on pressure until
they have "bought bonds." But if any bonds with special or unique
characteristics are planned, they are certainly sold pre-bid. Pre-for-
mal offering selling of bonds acquired in negotiated deals is much
more common; in fact, it is nearly universal.
Judgment of the general state of the market apart from the in-
vestor-appeal of a given issue is largely a judgment of relative in-
terest rates and yields. If the value of a given issue relative to that
of other tax-exempt securities has been determined—and investment
bankers appear to have great skill in making such value judgments
—then the problem is that of picking a series of yields that will
sell bonds against the general state of the money and capital mar-
kets. Investment bankers also develop considerable skill at judging
this aspect of the market. But mistakes are made and for a very
good reason. The judgment of quality and knowledge of investor
preferences and prejudices is not subject to short-term fluctuations.
Experience of the past can be brought to bear on the marketing
of any given governmental units securities now. But the money
disputed. For example, all of the Public Housing Administration sponsored
issues have the same basic credit foundation: the contractual assurance of debt
service by the federal government. But the issues of some cities sell on a better
basis than is true of other cities. And if the troubles potentially involved in
actuating a guarantee are an onerous burden on investors these differentials may
not be without some logic. Again, the fear of war damage seems to have made
investors prefer the bonds of interior and particularly midwestern communities
over the seaboard states and cities. Some towns seem to have an appeal to inves-
tors. that cannot be explained on objective grounds of credit analysis. But it is
still possible that these preferences are not without some foundation; in other
words one man's logic may be another man's fallacy. For example, the bond
issues of southern school districts have been severely penalized by the integra-
tion issue. In such a case it is hard to say just what is prejudice and what is
canny investment logic. In any event, investor preferences are a fact investment
bankers must face and a knowledge of these preferences is one of the prereq-
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and capital markets change and the pattern of change is not as
predictable. This is essentially a judgment of interest rates or re-
offering scales. A good reoffering scale not only should be at the
right level;it should have the right slope. It should sell bonds
equally well at all maturities. This is an extraordinarily difficult
judgment and a certain number of mistakes is inevitable.
The reoffering scale is, as monetary economists will recognize, a
kind of yield curve. It tends to follow the slope of other maturity-
determined interest rate differentials. But, as we note in Chapter
6, the reofferings scales for state and local government securities
often are not parallel to the other yield curves with which they
would seem to be closely allied. Market strategy often seems to
explain this lack of parallelism. As skilled judges of the market,
the investment bankers, and particularly the great houses and
banks that act as managers of the principal accounts, are very
sensitive to the appeal of particular issues to various segments of
the market. For example, a skilled account manager knows which
issues will appeal primarily to fire and casualty insurance compa-
nies. These firms usually prefer the intermediate maturities. For
such an issue the reoffering scale might be made a bit lower rela-
tively in the intermediate maturities than at either the short or
the long end of the scale. This effect might also be present, not
just because a given issue was expected to appeal to fire and cas-
ualty buyers, but because this group seemed to "have money" and
be in the market while other buyers were relatively less active.
When the commercial banks were heavy buyers of tax-exempt secu-
rities in 1954, the lower end of the reoffering scales for state and
local government obligations showed more slope than was true
of the corporate maturity scale. In other words, since the market
for tax-exempt securities is in some measure isolated from other
sectors of the market, the slope of the reofferings scale is affected
by market factors which do not operate in other sectors of the
market.
Setting a coupon structure. Some of the invitations to bid specify
that while the bidder may name the coupon, all maturities of the
entire Issue must bear this one coupon rate. When this is the case,
the second part of the bidding procedure is merged with the third
stage, indeed is dependentit fully. The gross margin that the
bidding group will "try for" is added to par and the lowest single
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coupon that will produce that amount of revenue at the agreed
offering scale is attached. If the bidders are permitted to set cou-
pons on the .05 or .10 percentage point intervals, then the margin
above par can be kept low. If, however, the coupons must be named
in quarters or eighths, then a rather more material margin may be
required. Under these circumstances a bidding group may some-
times be faced with the choice of adopting a coupon just under
the one that would have given them the margin they had initially
planned on working for—and then of cutting this margin enough
so as to post a par bid. This shaving of margins sometimes becomes
the means by which winning bids are posted.
Usually invitations to bid permit bidders rather wide latitude
in proposing coupon structures. When this is the case, the selection
of a coupon system becomes a matter of considerable strategic im-
portance.'2 The choice of coupon structure involves considerations
of two sorts. As explained and demonstrated in detail in Appendix
B, a coupon structure which is high in the short-term end and low in
the long-term end will tend to show lower interest Cost as computed
by the traditional formula used in state and local government se-
curity sales. The method of computing interest Cost used by mu-
nicipal finance authorities has this result because the cost of a
coupon paid on remote maturities has the same weight as a coupon
paid next year. The mathematics of "present value" calculations,
which underlie all conventional bond computations now employed
in the securities markets, discounts the yield (or cost) of a remote
coupon to "present value." Therefore, remote coupons have less
weight than nearby ones. Under the "present value" conventions
of computation no advantage would accrue to the use of "reverse
slope" coupon patterns. For this reason, bidders have at least one
good reason for shifting the high part of the coupon structure
into the early years as much as possible. But the pattern of in-
terest rates as a function of maturity has had a positive slope (has
been "rising") for the past twenty-five years—just the, opposite of
12 Percusand Leon Quinto have demonstrated the nature of this ad-
vantage mathematically. "The Application of Linear Programming to Com-
petitive Bond Bidding," Econometrica, October' 1956, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp.
The severe limitation of assumptions imposed by the methods used left most
of the strategic problems unexplained. The article also failed to recognize the
difference between "present value" methods of interest computation and the
traditional form prevailing in this bidding.
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the coupon pattern preferred for cost-influencing computation. If
the coupon structure and offering scale of an issue slope in oppo-
site directions, the early maturities will sell at premiums. the later
maturities at discounts.
This is not always good sales strategy. Many buyers, possibly a
majority of them, prefer to purchase a bond at a price not too far
from par. With the arithmetic of bond yields relatively simple, and
bond yield tables widely available, it might be thought that this
preference would make little difference. To some extent this is true
of institutional investors. But it is not wholly true of them and
hardly true at all of individuals.13 We noted a few minor exceptions
to this rule in Chapter 3 but securities which have a yield quite
remote from coupon and therefore involving substantial premiums
or discounts, often are hard to sell. The ability to market such
"hard-to-sell" securities may be the reason why a group can afford
propose a bizarre but bid-winning coupon structure.
Dealers themselves used to prefer to hold high coupon bonds
in their investment accounts since they were not until recently
required to amortize premiums on securities held less than thirty
days. For this reason there was an unusually active market in these
bonds among dealers.
The importance of nonamortization of premiums to dealers is
indicated by the considerable vigor with which they defended the
practice when it came up for legislative revision. On July 9, 1957,
the House Ways and Means Committee reported favorably on a
Bill (H.R. 8381) to require dealers to amortize premiums on all
tax-exempt bonds held by them. The IBA Municipal Securities
Committee actively opposed this provision and went so far as to
suggest alternatives which it claimed would close the "loophole."
This committee also urged IBA members to make representations
to their Congressmen that this provision would "cause an increase
in financing cost in state and municipalities."14 The report of the
Committee referred to the fact that "dealers may trade premium
bonds back and forth between themselves after holding the bonds
slightly less than 30 days, so that they can report 'loss' on the bonds
13Trusteesof a fund for which one person has a life interest and another
is remainderman have good legal and accounting reasons for avoiding sizeable
premiums or discounts.
14Reportof IBA Municipal Securities Committee to the IBA convention in
Hollywood, Florida, December 1957, as reported in the daily Bond Buyer of
December 16, 1957.
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as the premium disappears while receiving tax-exempt interest on
the bonds...
Highinitial coupons have a long history; they have been used
for at least two decades. But the low terminal coupon does not
seem to have been used much before 1954 and 1955. In 1954 sev-
eral issues of which the terminal maturities had coupons of 1 per
cent appeared; in the fall of 1955 some bonds with the terminal
maturities bearing one-fourth of 1 per cent were offered. In early
1956 this had been pushed just a bit further and at least two issues
had terminal maturities bearing coupons of one-tenth of1per
cent; one of these issues was for a forty-year maturity. The "pres-
ent" value of a forty-year bond of $1,000 par with such a coupon
to yield 3 per cent is slightly more than $350. In other words, a
bidding group that can find buyers for oddly couponed obligations,
and who are not obstructed by the lack of marketability that such
peculiarities probably impart to a bond, have a special bidding
advantage. Such specially couponed maturities probably have been
placed before the bid is ever entered; the preselling of such special
coupons therefore becomes a part of bidding strategy.
A canvass of a number of leading issues during the postwar pe-
riod suggests that high initial coupons have been placed on about
one-third of the new In most cases the high initial coupons
were applied to the first five maturities, but the period was longer
in some cases, shorter in others. On the basis of these two rather
rough estimates, it can be guessed that about one-twentieth of out-
standing state and local government debt consists of high coupon
obligations, a sum now somewhat in excess of $2½billion.The appeal
of these bonds to selected buyers was discussed in Chapter 3.
The low coupons on terminal maturities, while novel, are still
relatively rare and the portion of the outstanding debt represented
by them is trivial. Yield concessions of from 35 to 70 basis points
are needed to market abnormally low coupon bonds. Several in-
teresting examples of split coupon structures are shown in Chart
6. The notations on each spell out the salient features there rep-
resented. The devising of special systems of coupons, however, has
15Thiswas based on a tabulation of the 442 issues used in computing the
quarterly yield series presented in Chapter 6. The proportion of issues with
coupons on the early maturities which were in excess of the average coupon
was slightly more than 38 per cent.
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CHART6
Selected Examples, Coupon Structure Relative to Reoffering
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come to occupy an unusually strategic role in the selection of win-
fling bids, far more than the subject justifies on economic grounds
since coupon structures represent, not real differences in the eco-
nomic character of securities, but formal differences in the some-
what archaic system of interest computation employed by state and
local governments in awarding the sales of their obligations.
Gross underwriting margins. Since agreement on the kind of of-
fering scale that is salable is general, and since all of the bidding
groups have equal access to the device of special coupons, the criti-
cal difference among bids often is the profit margin planned by the
various bidding groups. Data which compare the proposed coupon
structures and proposed reoffering scales of losers with bid winners
are not available. We can only surmise about what would be found
if such data were available. But it seems to be widely felt among
the managers of underwriting accounts that the important differ-
ence among groups more often than not is the size of the gross
underwriting margin. This, of course, is a choice which faces all
merchandisers: whether to cut margin and speed up turnover or
to keep a rigid "markup" policy at the possible expense of sales.
The resources of our project did not permit us to study the point
statistically but the impression grew as we studied the problem that
there were real differences with respect to price policy among the
leading syndicate managers. Some firms are volume traders; others
work to keep their margins intact.
Since the problems of group organization should not increase
relative to the sizes of groups, it might be expected that bidding
groups would work for higher margins on small offerings. We were
able to secure data only on a few (less than one hundred) winning
deals, all of them handled by national houses. Thus smaller deals
handled by regional houses could not be included in this tabula-
tion. But among those for which figures were supplied, size appears
to have little effect on the margins. These data are further limited
in significance since they were mainly for deals completed in the
fourth quarter of 1955. The margins on the ninety-one deals
which figures were supplied are shown in Table 18.
This array discloses no evidence that big issues get preferential
treatment. Quite the contrary, it suggests, if anything, that the very
small issues were handled for narrower margins. But a negative
relationship seems as unreasonable as a positive one. Three of the
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TABLE 18
Gross Margins on Reofferings of State and Local Government
Securities Competitively Boughta
Average Margin per









100,000,000 and over 11.28(1)
Average of all sizes $11.61(91)
aSelectedaccounts opened largely during the fourth quarter, 1955.
b Number of cases included in each average shown in parentheses.
cases which reduced the average margin shown on deals under
$1 million were winning bids submitted by a single firm. All three
were for unusually high-grade even if small issues. When a deal
is within the underwriting and selling capacity of a single firm,
it is possible that it may be handled with quite a small margin.
It appears that profit margins are much more influenced by the
quality and average maturity of offerings than by size. This is sug-
gested by a cross tabulation appearing in Table 19.18 This table
suggests that the quality of issue is perhaps the leading factor ac.
counting for differences in margins. Average maturity also explains
a part of the differences among margins but less than quality.
Size, as already emphasized above, shows no sign of being a material
determinant of the margin chosen.
Gross margins are, of course, what the underwriting groups try
toachieve. If a reoffering fails to attract buyers and price cutting
becomes necessary, then margins shrink, even vanish, and sometimes
become negative. This is the cost of the pure underwriting function.
The extent to which such price cutting reduces margins is un-
16 The number of cases included in this tabulation is less than that shown in
Table 17 because ratings (or the lack of a rating) could be verified for only a
portion of the cases for which gross margins were supplied.
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•TABLE 19
Gross Margins on Reofferings of State and Local Government
Securities Competitively Bought,a by Quality and Maturity
Average Margin per $1,000 Bondb
MOODY'S RATING
Average maturity Aaa & Aa A and Lower Unrated
Less than 10 years $8.22(8) $10.65(11) ....
10 to 15 years 9.19(10) 12.60 (10) $14.33(3)
Over 15 years 9.32(4) 15.63(6) 14.03(3)
a Selectedaccounts opened largely during the fourth quarter, 1955.
b Number of cases included in each average shown in parentheses.
known. Since markets fluctuate, it must certainly be true that in
some years the frequency of such price cuts is material and must
affect underwriting profits materially. But in some periods these
cuts are far less common—but hardly ever absent. Even in the
strongest of markets, bidding groups every now and then over-
stretch themselves and must use the ancient weapon of price to
move their merchandise.
The data on margins which were collected covered only a brief
period late in 1955; it is quite likely that in other periods margins
might change in response to competitive and market conditions.
For example, it appears to have been the case that the gross mar-
gins built into underwriting deals in the early years of the postwar
decades were somewhat less than those put on deals in the later
years. During that period offerings were scarce, sales were easy and
groups were anxious buyers. Later this situation changed. During
the stiffer money markets of 1956, the margins on deals widened
by one to three dollars a bond; a kind of risk premium against
the hazards of a market that was thought to be uncertain and
even dangerous. During December 1956 the margins became par-
ticularly wide. While dealers were suffering heavy inventory losses,
they were often making unusually good margins on the new deals
that were well accepted. This pairing of unusual losses and gains
is what brings out the highest order of strategy and courage in
the investment banking community.
The margin between bids. The margins separating sealed public
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bids reflect both the precision of judgment involved and, to some
extent, the character of bidding strategy. Many winning bids are
relatively close to the second highest bids; these cases tend to be
publicized. To the extent this circumstance is representative of
bidding generally, it can be taken as evidence of the skill of invest-
ment bankers in judging the state of the market, assuming, of
course, that collusive practices are not followed. In our inquiry
we have found no evidence of such practices.
The repeated experience of the syndicates in preparing bids gives
them the foundation for remarkable accuracy in bidding strategy.
The process of organizing a group and preparing a bid are time-
consuming and expensive enough so that few groups enter into the
bidding competition unless fairly serious about wanting to buy
bonds. While each group wishes to submit a winning bid, no group
wants to be caught submitting one that is separated from the sec-
ond bid by much of a margin. Apart from the hazards of paying
too much, this margin is carefully noted by sophisticated investors
and is likely to hurt the salability of an issue. Investors argue that
since the bid winners paid an appreciable amount more for, the
issue than was offered by the second highest and other bidders, this
is evidence of overpaying so that the reoffering is no bargain.'7
The closeness of the bids, figured in terms of interest cost as
it is computed in most state and local government sealed bidding
sales,'8 may be deceiving; bids are calculated to minimize this cost.
When bidders are permitted to name their own coupon structure,
net interest cost is about the only form of comparison that can
be used but it is a deceiving basis of comparison, as Appendix B
shows.On sales where only a single coupon can be named, the com-
parison of bids is valid. When only one coupon rate can be named for
an entire issue, variation among bidders would usually be covered
by a range of about one-quarter of a per cent or less though this
range is sometimes exceeded. The winning and second best bid
17 This fact seems to open up the possible use of game strategy by bidding
groups. In a tight and uncertain market in which only two groups are competing
for an issue (and on larger issues the number of groups being formed is widely
known in the "street') one group might prefer to submit a quite low bid on
the general theory that at such a price they would be glad to buy the bonds.
If the "winning" group pays appreciably more, the low bid of the "losing" group
will embarrass the winning group in the reoffering sale. This would be the
strategy of the "let-up" pitch.
18 See Appendix B.
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will of ten be for the same coupon with the only difference being
in the amount of premium offered.'9
The margins that separate bids can easily be minimized by look-
ing only at the dramatic cases. About half of the time the margin
between the winning bid and the second best bid is less than one
dollar a bond. A close pair of bids may be separated by less than
25 cents a bond, and sometimes the margin is in pennies. But quite
often the margin is not only greater than one dollar; it may be
materially more. Every so often the winners' margin in a large and
well-publicized sale will considerably exceed the space that sepa-
rates the second from the third bids, and so on. In fact, the range
of prices found in the full scale of bids is often material. While
the range is usually less than ten dollars a bond, sometimes it is
rather more. In the sale of big issues when the number of bidding
groups is small—probably not more than two groups in the case
of very big issues—the margin between the first and second bid
is also the full range of prices. Such margins tend to be rather
small. But an intermediate sized issue may bring out quite a few
bids covering a considerable range. In the sale of very small issues,
the margins between bids are often much higher. If such an issue
attracts only a couple of bidders, the margin between bids may
easily be from ten to twenty dollars a bond.
NATIONAL VERSUS LOCAL SYNDICATES
Larger state and local government issues are generally marketed
by national syndicates, that is, syndicates managed by firms oper-
ating throughout the country and including a geographically dis-
tributed membership. Smaller issues, however, tend to be marketed
either by local syndicates or occasionally by a single, sizable under-
writer. There is no exact margin of size at which issues become
too small to attract national interest and therefore come to attract
bids only from local syndicates. One study of the underwriting of
southern municipals suggest that virtually all issues of $250,000 or
less were locally underwritten. Those over $1,000,000, on the other
19Becausean arithmetically, valid direct comparison is not possible we pre.
pared only a few tentative and approximate tabulations comparing winning and
other bids. The observations in the following paragraph are based on these
fragments.
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hand, were quite generally handled by national syndicates. The
point of uncertainty was from $250,000 to $1,000,000.20
This study also suggested that local syndicates were more likely
to handle either unrated issues or those of very high credit rating.
Those of intermediate credit ratings, if of adequate size, tended
to be handled by national syndicates. This study also pointed out
that a national syndicate would usually include several firms lo-
cated in the area of the issuing authority, presumably because of
their strategic position for selling the obligations.
No evidence was uncovered as to whether the activity of local
syndicates varied between areas of the country. On the West Coast
leading banks often organize syndicates for securities originating
in their area. These syndicates, though dominated by local houses,
often should be treated as being definitely national in status. On
the other hand, very high quality New England issues are often
purchased by a single large firm. In other words, there is some evi-
dence of regional diversity in the handling of the smaller and inter-
mediate-size issues, though not a clear enough difference to furnish
a foundation for further generalization.
SELLING STRATEGY OF SYNDICATES
When a syndicate is organized, it may be made an undivided
account (sales efforts are pooled) or a divided account (each mem-
ber is responsible for his share of sales). By reserving some bonds
for syndicate account, some accounts are of a mixed nature. The
issue is sometimes a cause of friction between syndicate managers
and members. The sales efforts of members depend, to some extent,
on the type of account of which they are a member.
The cherished hope of every syndicate manager is that when he
has been successful in buying bonds, he will be able to resell them
promptly at the scale agreed upon initially. Immediately after learn-
ing of winning a bid, the manager and other account members will
put on a vigorous drive to sell an issue as quickly as possible; they
like to have an issue "go out of the window." The mechanics of
telephone selling involves strenuous and active work for the first
few hours. If such a success is attained, the affairs of the syndicate
20'Southernversus Non-Southern Underwriting of Municipals," by Charles T.
Taylor, Southern Economic Journal, October 1957, Vol. xxiv,No.2.
122THE MARKETING OF NEW ISSUES
may be completed quickly and the accounts settled and reported
back to the members by .the manager.
If, however, an offering does not meet with such striking success
and some bonds remain unsold after the initial effort, a number
of strategic decisions must be made. If it is felt that the market
itself has changed between the time of entering the bid and the
moment of selling,it may be argued that prices should be cut
immediately to bring the issue into line with other obligations.
This, however, is generally not done for some period. A syndicate
would be thought guilty of remarkably bad judgment if it cuts prices
quickly. By and large, syndicate managers are more likely to favor re-
taining initial offering prices than the smaller members who have a
somewhat more nervous and uncertain attitude and may be readier
to cut prices. Indeed, one of the functions of the syndicate man-
ager of a divided liability account is to police the reoffering and to
make sure that members are not covertly cutting prices in order
to sell their portion of a slow issue.
The syndicate contract normally runs for 30 days but is usually
subject to renewal. Accounts are frequently held together for some-
what longer periods, but at some stage after 60 days a possibility
of closing out the account and distributing the unsold bonds to
the members is seriously considered. Once an account has been
broken up and the obligations distributed to members, each one
is at liberty to follow such price or holding policies his judgment
dictates or his financial position permits.
The roles of individual investment banking firms and of indi-
vidual commercial banks differ greatly in a syndicate. Some firms
have "good distribution"(a large or effective sales organization)
but they do not have the capital to act as major underwriters.
Other firms stand in the opposite position of having ample capi-
tal to take underwriting risks but of having somewhat less broad
distributive outlets. Still other firms may have the kind of aggres-
sive executives that make them natural managers; others may lack
such talent and leadership. Such specialization weighs in the for-
mation of a syndicate.
Concessions to dealers. As is customary in the reoffering of secu-
rities, the syndicates generally make' "concessions" to any dealer
who is a member of the National Association of Security Dealers.
These concessions can be viewed as a kind of sales commission
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although they permit dealers to buy such securities for their own
account at a price a bit below the offering price. It is also cus-
tomary, although not universal, to allow slightly larger concessions
to account members than to other dealers.
Because state and local government securities are usually offered
in serial form, the concessions often take on a somewhat complex
pattern, the usual variation being that the shorter maturities are
given the lower concessions. The greater sales effortis usually
thought necessary for the longer maturities, so larger concessions
are given for the long maturities. But circumstances vary; in some
markets the middle maturities seem to be harder to move and
they are given the larger concessions. The pattern of concessions
is also influenced by the quality of securities; the higher-grade
securities are thought easier to sell and are given somewhat smaller
concessions. A distribution of concessions based on late 1955 data
is shown in Table 20. This table was based on observations for
only one month; it does not reflect the fact agreed to by most ob-
servers that concessions vary according to the state of market,
TABLE 20
Concessions Made to Members of the National Association of
Security Dealers by Syndicates Reoffering State and











4th to 5th maturities
6th to 10th maturities
11th to 20th maturities


























a Basedon either Moody's or Standard Statistics ratings:
b Includes a very few cases of concessions of a s%th.
Source: Reports of reofferings of leading municipal issues in the month of
December 1955 as reported in the Investment Dealers' Digest. Since each maturity
was treated as a separate issue, the totals in the table above are individual
maturities, not of offerings. -
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small when sales are easy and larger when money and capital mar-
kets are tighter.
Since the concessions to members of syndicates for "taking down"
securities are not published, we did not have access to any reliable
record of these amounts. It is reported, however, that members'
concessions are often larger by about one-eighth or one-fourth at
each maturity except for the very short ones. If part of an issue
is not reoffered, there is, of course, no concession since there is no
outside sale of such a portion.
In the case of revenue obligations, which are more often in term
(single maturity) rather than serial form, the concessions seem to
be roughly equal to or slightly larger than those allowed on the
sale of term corporate obligations. The margins on the sale of
negotiated issues, particularly for turnpikes not yet constructed,
have generally been at least two points (or $20 a bond) and some-
times almost twice this amount. Such an amount is materially
higher than the margin for corporate underwriting. Concessions
on deals of this sort have usually been somewhat larger than shown
in Table 20, at least three-fourths of a point.
Concessions may be crudely estimated to account for about one-
third of the gross margin on state and local government reofferings,
sometimes more. This runs fairly parallel to the concession fraction
prevailing in the case of public offerings of corporate bonds.
Divided and undivided accounts. The rather strong feelings of
investment bankers with respect to the choice between divided and
undivided liability is not related to the issue that might be indi-
cated by these words. The financial strength of underwriters is
generally such that the financially strong members of a syndicate
are not usually worried about the ability of the others to perform
their ultimate underwriting functions. The issue is rather one of
the way in which the members discharge their liability to each
other. In the case of an undivided liability with a large lot of the
securities assigned for syndicate selling, the sales effort of each
member is, in effect, a sales effort for the entire syndicate. A mem-
ber continues to be "liable" for unsold obligations no matter .what
his own sale success may have been. With divided liability a mem-
ber may discharge his liability by selling a proportion of obligations
equivalent to his participation. In other words those syndicate
members with good distributive outlets and strong sales forces much
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prefer divided liability. Firms with large underwriting strength in
the form of capital, but with weaker distribution, prefer undi-
vided liability.
Because of record-keeping problems, serial issues are more likely
to be handled as undivided accounts, term bonds as divided ac-
counts. In weak markets, some firms will stay in a divided account
whereas they would withdraw from an undivided account because
of confidence that they can be more successful in selling the bonds
involved than other members of such an account.
INVENTORY POLICIES OF UNDERWRITERS
This market is quite delicately poised. While it is often in a
state of equilibrium, it is usually an unstable equilibrium at best.
Like a block poised on one end, it can be upset with relative ease.
Profit margins relative to potential losses are small; sharp price
movements produce sizable inventory losses or profits. Because of
the fixed offering price in the new issues market, dealers hold to
the suspicion that losses are more likely than profits and that the
profits on ordinary business must be fairly good to offset the in-
evitable losses on some deals.
Capital margins in the securities business are thin; inventories
may be rather large relative to capital. As a matter of business
policy, many of the firms participating in the underwriting of state
and local government issues do not have enough capital to justify
the taking of what seem like very good risks. For example: suppose
a given "deal" turns slow for reasons that everyone believes to be
temporary. A firm with considerable capital may be justified in
holding the securities involved in the deal until the expected re-
covery in the market takes place. But a smaller firm might, for very
good strategic reasons, find it unwise to follow such a policy. Even
if the chances of early recovery are excellent, the risks of the alter-
native are excessive. If the "deal" stays frozen, the small firm with
little capital cannot enter new deals;it becomes stuck with no
merchandise to sell except some securities on which it cannot cut
price. Its sales force may become rusty or lost to other firms who
are still active. Thus, small firms with little capital are disposed
to close out and take their losses early. Large firms, particularly
the leaders of groups, do not like to acquire the reputation of having.
managed slow deals that are broken up or on which losses are taken.
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They want—if their capital permits—to hold out. Pride as much
as profits often seems to account for this attitude.
The considerations that lie back of these have the
flavor of strategy much more than of traditional economic analysis.
Many times the decision of an offering group as to whether to hold
together or break up depends on the amount of free and uninvested
funds available. The great institutional investors use a standard
excuse if they wish to back away from a deal: they can claim to be
"out of money." By this they mean that they have committed all of
their investment funds; none are free. But the accounting measure-
ment of this point seems to be ambiguous; institutional practices
vary. Investors who claim to be "out of money" seem to be able
to find money when the bargains get sufficiently attractive.
Any one investor can be fairly confident that if enough investors
back away from the market, it will "come their way." Yields will
improve and prices will go down. So the strategy of investors may be
that of backing away from current offerings even though they are
of the investment quality they prefer. Their funds can temporarily
be invested in short-term form. The cost of holding off depends on
the level of short-term interest rates. When short-term interest rates
are low, investors suffer a material loss if they hold funds not fully
invested at the full term their investment policy permits. Any short-
term gains they may make on possible changes in the market in
their favor may be lost in reduced interest income. Investment
bankers, able to borrow at much less than the accruing coupons
on their inventory, make a profit on their "carry," and so may be
in no great hurry to sell, particularly if the visible supply of new
issues forthcoming in the future periods is sparse and uncertain.
On the other hand, when short-term rates are high and close to,
or even possibly above, long-term interest rates, investors can em-
ploy their money in short-term form without much loss of income,
with sometimes even a little gain. At the same time, investment
bankers, to the extent they use borrowed money, make no profit
on carrying an inventory of unsold securities; indeed they suffer
the unmeasurable losses of hobbling or inability to take on new
business. If the volume of new business "visible" in the future2l
21 Visible supply has a number of technical definitions in the securities mar-
kets. In the municipal bond market the statistical practice of the Bond Buyer
is to treat specifically announced competitive offerings falling within the next
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should :be large, the incentives for closing. Out of accounts is
ticularly high.
This delicately poised nature of the municipal bond market ac-
counts for conditions that are sometimes described by such drastic
terms as panic or near-panic. An examination of the periods de-
scribed as "panics" indicates that they were those in which the
structure of the market broke down; dealings became impossible
and the market suffered from a kind of freezing. Drastic price de-
clines can take place without panic if a market still exists and if
buyers and sellers stand ready to do business at some price. Prac-
tical market analysts sometimes measure this by the time continuity
of price quotation changes. For example, the organized stock ex-
changes, the New York Stock Exchange in particular, place great
emphasis on the continuity of quotations. They charge the specialist
with the function of "making markets," which amounts to furnish-
ing such a time continuity of prices and transactions. Considerable
discontinuities in price would not violate the economist's ideas of
markets if rational interpretation of prevailing circumstances ac-
counts for the discontinuities. But under conditions of panic a. large
majority of those who can, withdraw from the market either as
buyers or sellers. Then those under external pressure to find a
market at any price may find that no market exists; no buyers will
give firm bids for any appreciable volume. Panic is really a paralysis
of the market function. Withdrawal from the market accounts for
such paralysis; yet this withdrawal may be prompted by quite
rational behavior on the part of the principal participants.22
EFFECTS OF SIZE OF ISSUE ON MARKETABILITY
One of the commonest criticisms of the investment banking sys-
tem as it now operates in the United States is that, while offering
excellent service to the giant corporations, itfails to meet the
financial needs, of smaller-sized businesses. This criticism could not
thirty days as being a part of the visible supply. Negotiated financings are not
included in the Bond Buyer visible supply. On the other hand, the Investment
Dealers Digest treats any definitely announced corporate offering of debt securi-
ties as being a part of the visible supply, no matter how far off in the future.
22Sincewe do not have an economics of the individual financial firm, this
point cannot be pursued very far. Common observation suggests that competi-
tion of the sort that narrows profit margins hastens the withdrawal incentives
and so renders a supposedly competitive market more subject to panic than a
more administered market.
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be leveled at the investment banking support of smaller local
governmental financing. Indeed, one of the more significant find-
ings of this survey is that moderate sized local governmental units
seem to fare quite well in the new issues market, often better than
the big cities. Small state offerings often seem to fare better than
those of the big states that come to the capital markets more often.
Tiny local governmental units probably pay modestly higher rates
than middle-sized cities of comparable credit rating, but it would be
hard to support the charge that they are much penalized for their
small size. Indeed, a small local governmental unit which main-
tains a strong credit position probably can borrow without more
than a nominal discount for size.
Just how relevant this analogy isto business finance may be
argued. Small business may suffer from its size as well as its credit
weakness in securing access to the long-term capital markets. But
if the credit standing of small business were generally as good
relatively as the credit standing of small state and local govern-
ment units, isit not possible that the machinery of investment
banking would soon emerge to give such 'small business access to
long-term credit on terms relatively as good as those enjoyed by
smaller local government units? The point is worth reflection.
Big state and local government offerings equal the largest of
corporate offerings. But at the other extreme, a large number of
relatively small issues are offered on the market. The (arithmetic)
average size of the long—term state and local government offerings
which was reaching the pages of the Bond Buyer in the first half
of 1956 was just a little more thanmillion. Unadvertised issues
doubtless were much smaller in size. In the early years of the decade
this average was only a little more than half as great. The arithmetic
averages doubtless conceal considerable distributional skewness.
Roughly four-fifths of new offerings are in issues of under $1 million.
The median size of offering tabulated by the research department
of the Investment Bankers Association for the first half of 1956 was
about a quarter of a million dollars.23
Very small issues are typically bid for and bought by a single buyer
rather than by a formally organized bidding group. As Table 21
shows, about two-thirds of the issues under half a million dollars
reported in the Bond Buyer for the month of December 1955 were
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awarded to single bidders. If the even smaller issues that elude
reporting were included, the proportion would doubtless have been
still larger. As this table also shows, the industry of investment
banking seems to adapt itself to the formation of a great number
of small accounts readily. The participation of commercial banks,
essentially local institutions by nature, and of the smaller invest-
ment banking houses undoubtedly contributes to this result.
An interesting conclusion may be drawn from this table. The
relatively small number of bonds for each member in these buying
groups suggests considerable spreading of the risk. In a majority of
these groups the average number of bonds per member is from
200 to 500. The underwriting of state and local government obliga-
tions is not regulated so the sizes of participation of "major" and
other members of buying groups are not published. The participa-
tion of even major members, however, is bound to be relatively
small when compared with the allotments in corporate bond buying
accounts.
The gearing of the investment banking machinery for handling
modest-sized state and local government offerings as well as the giant
ones can be shown in still another way: the number of bids attracted
by offerings of various sizes. If the number of bids attracted by
offerings of moderate size is adequate to insure competitive vigor,
it can be presumed that governmental units borrowing in such
amounts do not suffer from discrimination in the capital markets.
A tabulation of the number of bids attracted by offering of various
sizes is shown in Table 22.24
Asthis table shows, the very small and the very large issues attract
fewer bids than intermediate sized issues. This tabulation does not
prove the presence of active bidding for the very small issues, nor
does it prove the absence of such bidding. Very small state and
24Onedefect in this table, described in a note to it, should be emphasized
so as to avoid misunderstanding. This table wasbasedon the reports of com-
pleted sales published in the five weekly issues of the Bond Buyer for December
1955. While the editors make great efforts to get complete reports, the number
of bidders cannot always be determined from the official reports submitted to
the Bond Buyer. Furthermore, there is a reasonable suspicion that when an
award of sale is made to the sole bidder for an issue, this fact may be obscured
in the official report for reasons of pride and otherwise. The tabulation shown
in Table 22 includes only those cases in which it seemed reasonably clear that
all of most of the bids submitted were reported. But the chance of error and


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eTHE MARKETING OF NEW ISSUES
local government units may find it difficult to attract a great deal
of interest to their issues. But no such difficulty exists for inter-
mediate sized issues. Issues of half a million dollars or more attract
an ample number of bids. And, as we noted above, small issues
not seem to have a marketing cost higher than that found in larger-
sized offerings. Though not shown by this table, it is doubtless true
that the sales attracting quite a large number of bids are of mod-
erate-sized but high-quality issues. In other words, there is a kind
of character to the distribution of the number of
Very large sales will attract only a few bids because it is not prac-
tical to organize a large number of accounts. Small sales tend to
attract only a few local bids. But intermediate-sized issues attract a
substantial number of bids.
It seems fairly evident that this circumstance works to the ad-
vantage of moderate-sized local government units which maintain
a highly regarded financial standing. They attract many bidders
and probably get the advantage of low interest costs as a result.
Chapter 6 develops the point that the yields on these moderate-sized
issues often appear to be better than on the very large issues. Part of
this superiority in the borrowing ability of these intermediate sized
units is doubtless due to the fact that investors often search for
such names in the process of getting area diversification. But the
number of bidders must also be a substantial factor in achieving
such excellent results. In the offering of very large issues the or-
ganization of only a few groups, often only two, is feasible. When
only two groups are competing, they can appraise rather closely
the bidding strategy of the other side; the analytical apparatus of
duopoly applies. The influence of "strategic restraint" comes to
bear, and pricing does not "get out of line." But when a larger
number of smaller groups are bidding on a moderate-sized issue,
the appraisal of strategy by opposing bidders cannot be as precise.
In these cases each bidding group cannot be aware of the existence
of all other bidding groups and of their composition. A "dark horse"
group may easily emerge to win the bid.26 Bids can "get Out of line."
25 Also noted by McClintock (Harriman, Ripley & Co.), in Part 1, Section 9,
page 9, of the 1946 looseleaf edition of Fundamentals of investment Banking
cited in note 1 of this chapter.
26 This suggests still one more way in which game theory may have relevance
to this market. When there are only two groups, the problems of strategy. can
be reduced to two-party, non-zero-sum game form. The circumstances in which
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THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON THE MARKETING
OF NEW STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ISSUES
Most state and local government issues are sold by sealed public
bidding. The predominance of this with respect to general
tions is shown in Table 23. This also shows that negotiated sales,
TABLE 23
Method of Offering Municipal Bond Issues, 1957












Public sealed bidding$4,519 94.4 $1,323 65.8 $5,842 85.8
Negotiated sales 195 4.1 638 31.5 833 12.2
Private placements 71 1.5 65 3.2 136 2.0
Totals $4,785 100.0 $2,026 100.0 $6,811 100.0
Federal government loans are excluded.
Source: IBA Statistical Bulletin, No. 6, January 8, 1958, p. 8.
though relatively more important in the case of revenue obligations,
are still less frequent than competitive sales.
Competitive bidding unquestionably narrows the gross margin
earned by investment bankers; there seems to be no doubt of that
fact. But the procedure may be clumsy, and dating of the sale far
in advance reduces the maneuverability of the borrower. A nego-
tiated offering may be put before the market quickly when condi-
tions appear favorable; the investment bankers' greater margin may
be far more than saved in a lower interest cost to the borrower—if
truly superior timing thus becomes possible. But the validity of this
assumption is not proved. Perhaps the borrowers connected with
investment bankers of superior judgment would benefit from
superior timing, but can this be true of everyone? If a given volume
of state and local government securities is to be marketed over the
long run, can every borrower benefit from superior timing? If the
answer to this last question is affirmative, it begins to sound as if
investors suffered net lower returns from securities marketed through
larger numbers participate, however, can only be dealt with descriptively and
without the more formal and rigorous apparatus.
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negotiation rather than by means of competitive bidding. But this
certainly does not seem to be the testimony of investors; indeed,
some of them regard competitive bidding as a way of persuading
investment bankers to pay too much for securities. But if this latter
view is true, then it again appears that competitive bidding may
have some advantages for the borrowers as over against lenders.
A more sophisticated view might be that in periods of moderate
capital demand with high security prices and low yields, competitive
bidding probably favors borrowers and trims the yields available
to investors. But in a tight money market with high capital demand
and a barely adequate flow of saving, then competitive bidding
exposes the borrower to some marketing hazards. Even in such
periods, the average cost to borrowers may be just as low with
competitive bidding as with negotiation, but some borrowers then
fare worse than would be true with negotiation and some fare
better.
At least one contrast seems to be valid: the existence of competi-
tive bidding does not lend itself very well to the kind of continuing
secondary market that most borrowers like to see prevail for their
securities. A small governmental unit comes to the market rarely
and its occasional offerings are absorbed by investors without leav-
ing much of a trace. If a few of these securities reappear in the
secondary market, the turnover cost is high, but again they leave
little trace in the market. But a large governmental unit that must
face the market time after time, possibly with only moderate inter-
vals between financing operations, has to worry about the supply of
its securities in the secondary market. If an appreciable volume of
its securities drift back into the secondary market, the prices needed
to move these securities may tend to be low and to blight the
chances of getting a good price on its next offering. Indeed, such
a governmental unit may find it advantageous to maintain a kind
of supporting operation so as to maintain a good price record for
its outstanding securities.
If such a governmental unit has a negotiated and continuing
relationship with a single investment banker, it is entirely possible
that the trading department of this investment banker may be able
to keep a healthier tone in the secondary market for the unit's
securities than would be true if it was financed by means of competi-
tive offerings. The winner of a bid will undertake to market the
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bonds he has "won," but he can hardly be expected to maintain
a continuing interest in the market for the obligations of this
issuing governmental unit.
The existence of competitive bidding does not.mean that invest-
ment bankers fail to have a continuing interest in the financial
affairs of public bodies. Finance officers seek the help and advice
of investment bankers on market problems. The amount of time
and energy the investment bankers can give finance officers is more
limited than is true in the case of negotiated relationships—but
investment bankers appear to take a conscientious interest in these
problems.
136